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Basile: Criminal Usury

CRIMINAL USURY AND ITS IMPACT ON NEW YORK
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
Christopher Basile*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Choice-of-law provisions have the devastating potential of
bypassing state statutes implemented to protect the general public and
undermining the legislative intent of a state. A choice-of-law clause is
a provision in a contract where the parties choose a state’s law to
govern any conflicts or disputes that may arise between the parties. 1
Lenders may implement choice-of-law clauses in their contracts to
avoid statutes or regulations of various states. 2 Many lenders use
choice-of-law provisions to avoid New York laws and regulations
intentionally. Additionally, inconsistencies and misinterpretations of
New York law by the federal and state courts have led to forum
shopping to exploit loopholes and bypass implications of violating
New York law. Lenders attempt to avoid New York’s criminal usury
statutes through choice-of-law clauses. A lender commits usury when

* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2021; Hofstra University,
B.A. in Business, 2012; Frank G. Zarb School of Business at Hofstra University, M.S. in
Accounting, 2013. I would like to give a special thanks to my father, Mark Basile, for inspiring
and motivating me to go into the field of business. My father is one of the leading attorneys
on the issue of usury in the United States and is an adjunct professor at Touro College Jacob
D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Next, I would also like to thank Professor Miller for introducing
me to the fundamental essentials of business law. Professor Miller’s assistance as both my
faculty advisor and my business law professor was the rudiment and driving force to the
completion of this Note. Additionally, thank you to Editor-in-Chief, Nicholas Maggio, and
Managing Editor, Olivia Lattanza, for their continued guidance and support throughout the
writing and editing process of this Note. Lastly, many thanks to my Notes Editor, Robert
Molinari, Jr., for overseeing my note in its early stages, and providing me with encouragement
and support throughout the writing and editing process.
1 Glen Banks, New York Practice Series: New York Contract Law § 8:3 (2019).
2 William B. Emmal, comment, Evading Prohibitions on Usury Through Choice of Law, 9
TRANSLAW 6 (2009). Emmal stated, “[s]ome lenders might also use a choice-of-law clause
to avoid the usury law of the state whose law would apply if no choice were made.” Id.
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the lender charges an illegal rate of interest on a financial instrument. 3
Thus, many lenders intentionally try to avoid New York’s criminal
usury statutes through the use of choice-of-law provisions or forum
shopping.
When a transaction is executed in New York between two
businesses, New York law should govern if the transaction is
substantially related to New York. 4 Additionally, when two parties
execute a transaction, one of the parties being in New York, and
fundamental public policy would be violated by enforcing a choice-oflaw provision. 5 New York law should govern the transaction. 6
Part II will provide a brief history of usury in New York. Part
III will analyze the various usury statutes of New York. This section
will also discuss how businesses may invoke criminal usury as an
affirmative defense, the required percentage threshold for a borrower
to invoke criminal usury in New York, and the various financial
instruments that the courts may deem as criminally usurious in New
York. Part IV will discuss how the courts calculate interest on
financial instruments in New York. Part V will delve into the intent of
predatory businesses and explain why these businesses choose certain
states to govern their contracts. Part VI will discuss New York’s
substantial relationship test and how it impacts choice-of-law
provisions. Part VII will examine New York’s fundamental public
policy and how it may supersede choice-of-law provisions. Part VIII
will examine the ramifications of criminally usurious transactions and
how these transactions are void in New York. Part IX will shed light
on the ambiguous nexus between criminally usurious transactions and
waivers. Part X will delve into inconsistencies in rulings between the
federal and state courts’ interpretation of New York’s usury laws,
which ultimately leads to forum shopping. Finally, Part XI will
conclude by discussing how the criminal usury laws should be
interpreted by all of the courts in New York when there is a choice-oflaw provision in dispute. The final section will reevaluate the usury
statutes and clarify the statutory language of criminal and civil usury,
75 Am. Jur. 3d. Proof of Facts § 103 (2019).
19A N.Y. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 34 (2019). A choice-of-law provision will not be
enforced or honored if the law chosen has no reasonable relationship or sufficient contacts
with the transaction or subject matter of the contract in question. Id.
5 19A N.Y. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 35 (2019). A choice-of-law provision will not be
enforced or honored where to do so would violate a fundamental or public policy of the forum
state.
6 Id.
3
4
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which will bring the federal and state decisions concerning criminal
usury into harmony.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF USURY IN NEW YORK

Since their founding, the courts in New York have taken a
strong position against enforcing loans with a rate of interest above
what is permitted by law. 7 Amidst establishing the foundation of
interest limitations on financial instruments, “the ‘Statute of Anne’
(1713), which fixed a maximum rate of interest at five percent for all
loans, was the model followed.” 8 In 1773, the Parliament of Great
Britain passed the Statute of Anne to reduce the rate of interest on a
loan without any prejudice to any Parliamentary Securities. 9 To
combat the inherent issues that are faced when parties with disparate
bargaining power enter into contractual agreements, the legislature of
New York enacted its first usury statute in 1787. 10
In New York State, the leading case regarding usurious
transactions is Curtiss v. Teller, 11 in which the New York Court of
Appeals held that usury statutes declare a usurious transaction void and
provide for forfeitures and penalties against the usurer. 12 The decision
and reasoning of the Curtiss Court were sustained nearly seventy years
later in Szerdahelyi v. Harris. 13 The Court of Appeals in Szerdahelyi
analyzed the history surrounding usury laws and noted that the
interpretation of the usury statutes in Curtiss is consistent with New
York’s legislative view on the matter. 14 In early judicial decisions,
there was no legislation in effect to bifurcate usury into civil usury and
criminal usury.
Further, the court held that a usurious transaction is void ab
initio, and a financial instrument with a total interest charge exceeding
the statutory limit results in the lender being unable to recoup the
7 Franklin W. Ryan, Usury and Usury Laws: A Juristic-Economic Study of the Effects of
State Statutory Maximums for Loan Charges upon Lending Operations in the United States,
Vol. 39, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1924, at 181.
8 Id.
9 Public Act, 13 Anne., c. 15 (Gr. Brit. 1773)
10 An Act for preventing Usury (Feb. 8, 1787), Reprinted in Laws of the State of New York,
Revised and Passed at the Thirty-Sixth Session of the Legislature, Volume 1.
11 112 N.E. 1056 (N.Y. 1916).
12 Id.
13 Szerdahelyi v. Harris, 490 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1986).
14 Id.
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money that he or she has advanced. 15 Additionally, if a lender’s total
interest charge exceeds the statutory limit, the lender cannot collect the
interest due on the transaction. 16 At the time Szerdahelyi was being
heard, the New York State legislature made further revisions to the
usury laws due to the evolving complexity of financial crimes such as
loan-sharking. 17 The courts in New York have described loansharking as “one of the most heinous, virtually bloodsucking criminal
activities of all times.” 18 The Legislature in New York subsequently
enacted comprehensive legislation to deal with this problem. The
express intent of this legislation was to “amend the penal law and the
general obligations law, concerning criminal usury and possession of
records of a criminally usurious loan.” 19 Usurious transactions are
ultimately void under New York law, regardless of whether they
violate the civil section of Statute 5-501 or the criminal section under
the New York Penal Law Section 190.40. 20
The current usury laws in New York are some of the strongest
and most exceptional in the nation, reflecting the principles adopted by
New York that go back to Lord Mansfield from the Kings High Court
in England, in the mid-to-late 1700s. 21 The New York Court of
Appeals was keenly aware of the issues arising from creative predatory
lenders more than 144 years ago and stated:
The shifts and devices of usurers to evade the statutes
against usury, have taken every shape and form that the
wit of man could devise, but none have been allowed to
prevail. Courts have been astute in getting at the true
intent of the parties, and giving effect to the statute. 22

15

Id.
Id.
17 Id.
18 Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 437 N.Y.S.2d 356, 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t
1980).
19 Szerdahelyi, 490 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1986).
20 See generally Bakhash v. Winston, 19 N.Y.S.3d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015);
Fareri v. Rain’s Int’l, Ltd., 589 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1992); Abir v. Malky,
Inc., 873 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009); Russkaya Reklama, Inc. v. Milman,
9 N.Y.S.3d 759 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Term 2015) (holding in all these cases that the usurious
transactions are void as a matter of law).
21 Quackenbos v. Sayer 62 N.Y. 344, 346 (N.Y. 1875) (“The most usual form of usury was
a pretended sale of goods.”). Id.
22 Id.
16
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The courts have acknowledged that the intent of lenders may
be latently sinister, and that usury may not be immediately apparent on
the face of a transaction.
Today, however, nearly 144 years later, private lenders
continue to prevail in using complex financial instruments that
disguise hidden fees, penalties, and rates on financial instruments to
bypass the court and extract a rate of interest that is more than New
York’s criminal usury statute. While complicated loan structures and
ambiguous language are apparent in today’s business transactions, at
the end of the day, a simple basic analysis premised on legal principles
that have existed for centuries will result in a finding of a usurious
transaction from which there is no recovery at all available to the
creditor. 23
III.

NEW YORK USURY STATUTES

New York bifurcated usury, and now a claim of usury may be
either civil usury or criminal usury. 24 General Obligation Law and
Penal Law contain usury statutes. 25 New York has enacted multiple
statutes reflecting a view of the heinous nature of usury. 26 According
to the New York Penal Law:
A person is guilty of criminal usury in the second
degree when, not being authorized or permitted by law
to do so, he knowingly charges, takes or receives any
money or other property as interest on the loan or
forbearance of any money or other property, at a rate
exceeding twenty-five per centum per annum or the
equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period. 27
Further, “criminal usury in the second degree is a class E
felony.” 28 In the event of a criminally usurious interest rate, the statute
estops the usurer from receiving interest on a loan. 29
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511 (McKinney 2019).
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 2019).
25 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2019).
26 Id.
27 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40.
28 Id.
29 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(4). “Interest shall not be charged, taken, or received on
any loan or forbearance at a rate exceeding such rate of interest as may be authorized by law
at the time the loan or forbearance is made.” Id.
23
24
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New York prohibits corporations from interposing the defense
of civil usury to a contract. 30 Only individuals may use civil usury as
an affirmative defense to a contract or in a plenary action. 31 Civil usury
in New York exists when the total interest on a financial instrument
exceeds a rate of sixteen percent per annum. 32 In New York, only
individuals may use civil usury as an affirmative defense to a
contract. 33 At first blush, it appears New York bars corporate
borrowers from claiming criminal usury as an affirmative defense in
New York. Nonetheless, while corporations cannot plead civil usury
as a defense to a contract, corporations may plead criminal usury as an
affirmative defense to a contract. 34 There is no legislative difference
between what is called “civil” usury and “criminal” usury when it
comes to New York’s General Obligation Law Statute 5-511, effective
2006. 35 However, usury is usury, and the Legislature saw fit to make
two “levels” of usury in response to growing loan-sharking in the state,
one that exceeds sixteen percent (civil), and the other that exceeds
twenty-five percent (criminal). 36
When a New York court finds that a financial instrument is
criminally usurious, the borrower may recover all interest payments or
deliveries that were above the twenty-five percent threshold. 37 The
Southern District of New York reinforced this remedy in Carlone v.
Lion & The Bull Films, Inc., 38 where the court stated that the borrower

30

Id.
Id.
32 Id.
33 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(3) (McKinney 2019). “(3) The provisions of subdivision
one of this section shall not apply to any action in which a corporation interposes a defense of
criminal usury as described in section 190.40 of the penal law.” Id.
34 Id.
35 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511.
36 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501. On a note, the civil usury threshold is an interest rate in
the excess of sixteen percent, whereas the criminal usury threshold on a note is an interest rate
in the excess of twenty-five percent. Id.
37 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-513.
Every person who, for any such loan or forbearance, shall pay or deliver
any greater sum or value than is allowed to be received pursuant to section
5-501, and his personal representatives, may recover in an action against
the person who shall have taken or received the same, and his personal
representatives, the amount of the money so paid or value delivered, above
the rate aforesaid.
Id.
38 861 F. Supp. 2d 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
31
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could recover any interest payments made in excess of the legal rate of
twenty-five percent. 39
New York’s General Obligation Law Statute 5-501, effective
2011, caps the maximum amount upon which to assert a claim under
Section 190.40 at $2,500,000.00. 40 The plain language of Section
190.40, as read with Statute 5-501, states that anything below
$2,500,000.00 is subject to criminal usury, and once found, voids the
transaction. 41 Capping the maximum amount to $2,500,000.00 to
make a financial instrument subject to the criminal usury statutes was
intended to solve the usury problem in New York regarding substantial
commercial loans. 42 However, the cap is now a significant reason why
multistate loan transactions are designated to be governed by New
York law. 43 The $2,500,000.00 limitation on the statute was upheld in
2009 by the New York Appellate Division. 44 Ultimately, the financial
instruments subject to the criminal usury statutes of New York include
bonds, bills, notes (both demand and promissory), assurances, and
conveyances. 45
Hence, in New York, a financial instrument is deemed void,
and therefore, a contract between corporations is considered invalid as
a matter of law when the lender charges a total interest on a financial
instrument that exceeds the statutory limits.46
All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, all
other contracts or securities whatsoever . . . whereupon
or whereby there shall be reserved or taken, or secured
or agreed to be reserved or taken, any greater sum, or
greater value, for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or other things in action, than is prescribed in
section 5-501, shall be void . . . . 47

Id. at 324.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501.
41 Id.
42 Joshua Stein, Confusury Unraveled: New York Lenders Face Usury Risks In Atypical Or
Small Transactions, N.Y. St. B.J. 25, at 28 (August 2001).
43 Id.
44 Shasho v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 888 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009)
(holding that the statute providing the laws regulating the maximum rate of interest did not
apply to loans or forbearances of $2,500,000 or more).
45 NY GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501.
46 Id.
47 Id.
39
40
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Thus, if a court deems a contract involving one of these
financial instruments to be criminally usurious in New York, the
contract is deemed to be void as a matter of law. 48
IV.

CALCULATING THE TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE ON
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN NEW YORK

New York’s usury statutes are unambiguous on what is
considered in calculating the interest on a financial instrument. The
plain meaning of the statute and case law in New York dictate that
interest charges include the amount on reserve to a creditor or a lender
at the time of the execution of a financial instrument. 49 The analysis
focuses only on the time a financial instrument is executed under the
General Obligation Law Statute 5-501, and not on what the usurer
ultimately collects.
Interest rates on a financial instrument are the leading figures
in determining if a transaction is criminally usurious. 50 An interest rate
is “the percentage that a borrower of money must pay to the lender in
return for the use of money . . . expressed as a percentage of the
principal payable . . . .” 51 An illegal rate of interest is “an interest rate
higher than the rate allowed by law. 52 The usury statutes of New York
suggest that when determining if a transaction is criminally usurious,
a proper analysis of hidden interest rates, including default rates, must
be undertaken. 53 The New York Court of Appeals held that interest
includes not only the interest rate charged in the note but also various
other fees, including loan “origination fees” paid by the borrower or
deducted from the loan proceeds. 54 The courts should consider
additional fees and hidden interest on a financial instrument in
determining if a transaction is criminally usurious. 55 These additional
fees and hidden interest may include—but are not limited to—

48

Id.
Id.
50 Id.
51 Interest Rate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
52 Id.
53 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501.
54 People v. Central Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Nassau County, 385 N.E.2d 555
(N.Y. 1978).
55 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501.
49
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prepayment penalties, stock options and exercising warrants, and
default penalties. 56
Prepayment penalty provisions surrounding a financial
instrument may be considered interest in calculating the total interest
charged to determine if a financial instrument is criminally usurious.57
A prepayment penalty is the right of a lender to refuse any early tender
towards an obligation by the borrower or to exact a fee or premium
upon the borrower in the event of payment towards an obligation that
is earlier than what the parties expressed and outlined within a
contract. 58 The courts consider a prepayment penalty when the penalty
brings the total interest computed on a financial instrument above the
maximum lawful rate of twenty-five percent. 59 Conversely, if a
prepayment penalty provision does not raise the total interest charged
above the twenty-five percent threshold, then the prepayment
provision does not, by itself, render the financial instrument criminally
usurious. 60
The courts must consider stock options and exercising warrants
on a financial instrument in calculating the total interest to determine
if a financial instrument is criminally usurious. 61 Convertible notes are
hybrid financial instruments containing both unsecured debt and an
option component with its discrete value. 62 The courts also consider
the value of stock options in calculating the effective interest on a
financial instrument. 63 Further, the value of a common stock given to
a lender is critical in calculating the total interest charged on a financial
instrument. 64 The underlying reasoning for these decisions is that a
56

Id.
Alan J. Jacobs, J.D., Rachel M. Kane, M.A., and Kimberly C. Simmons, J.D., 72 N.Y.
Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 101 (August 2019).
58 Robert K. Baldwin, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey and Suggestion, 40 VAND. L. REV.
409, 411 (1987).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Hillair Capital Invs., L.P. v. Integrated Freight Corp., 963 F. Supp. 2d 336, 341 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
62 In re Bridge Info. Sys., 311 B.R. 781, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2004) (holding that the
unsecured debt component and option in convertible notes have discrete values, and therefore,
should be valued separately).
63 Hillair Capital Invs., L.P. v. Integrated Freight Corp., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (holding
that the value of a stock option is critical in calculating and evaluating the true amount of a
financial instrument and the effective interest rate being charged).
64 Sabella v. Scantek Med., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 453 (CM)(HBP), 2009 WL 3233703, at *1,
*21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2009) (ruling that the value of common stock given to a lender
should be taken into account when calculating interest rates).
57
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borrower issuing stock is agreeing to give something up for value to
the lender. 65 In New York, a financial instrument is usurious when a
creditor is entitled to the principal balance along with a legal rate of
interest plus additional payments that are contingent on an event that
is out of the borrower’s control. 66 Warrants on a financial instrument
are equivalent to options, and the courts should treat the valuation of
warrants as an original issue discount (OID). 67 Thus, the courts should
consider warrants in calculating the total interest on a financial
instrument. 68
In New York, the courts must consider a default penalty and a
default interest on a financial instrument in calculating the total interest
to determine if a financial instrument is criminally usurious.
Generally, financial instruments contain default provisions, which act
as a penalty to deter a breach of contract. 69 The default interest is
usually a higher interest rate than the effective interest appearing on
the face of a financial instrument. 70 Historically in New York, a
default penalty and default interest were not considered an interest in
the calculation on total interest charged relating to criminal usury.71
However, as of 2017, New York began considering default provisions
on a financial instrument in the calculation of the total interest charged
on an instrument. 72 If a default provision within a financial instrument
brings the total interest charged over the twenty-five percent threshold
of New York, then the default provision is considered to determine if
the financial instrument is criminally usurious. 73
65 In re Bridge Info. Sys, 311 B.R. at 791 (noting that possible proceeds from the sale of a
stock option to a third party are an “opportunity cost”).
66 Phlo Corp. v. Stevens, No. 00 Civ. 3619(DC), 2001 WL 1313387, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 25, 2001) (noting that a contingent right to a bonus is something of value, and that this
value must be added to the maximum interest charged in excess of the legal rate).
67 Custom Chrome, Inc. v. Commissioner, 217 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
the original issue discount is the difference between the redemption price at maturity and issue
price, and therefore, a type of interest).
68 Id.
69 American Law Reports, Validity and effect of anticipatory provision in contract in
relation to rate of interest in the event of default, 12 A.L.R. 367 (1921).
70 Id.
71 Kraus v. Mendelsohn, 948 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121 (ruling that the defense of usury did not
apply where a promissory note at issue imposed a rate in excess of the statutory maximum
only after the note’s default or maturity).
72 Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC., 237 F.Supp.3d 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding
that the criminal usury cap setting the maximum interest rate of twenty-five percent does apply
to default obligations).
73 Id.
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THE INTENT OF PREDATORY BUSINESSES

The four corners of a financial instrument can display a
lender’s usurious intent. 74 Furthermore, as a matter of law, a court can
find a lender’s usurious intent. 75 Intent is a critical element in a usury
analysis. 76 When a lender of a financial instrument charges an interest
rate above twenty-five percent, the statutory rate, it is immaterial
whether the lender had explicit intent. 77 In a situation such as this, a
court finds the lender’s intent implied even though a lender had no
actual intent to violate the usury laws. 78 New York courts have
consistently ruled that when usury is determined to exist, the intent is
implied. 79
The court in In re Rosner noted that when usurious intent is not
found on the face of the financial instrument, usury becomes a disputed
question of material fact. 80 Nonetheless, the conversion discount
option and the default remedies expressly stated in the contract of the
financial instrument set the total interest charge of the financial
instrument above twenty-five percent. 81 Therefore, in In re Rosner,
the plaintiff established the defendant’s intent to charge a usurious rate
of interest. 82
A person who comes to court with unclean hands is not
afforded any equitable remedies. 83 When it comes to criminal usury,
intent to charge a criminally usurious rate is implied based on the face

Blue Wolf Capital Fund II, L.P. v. Am. Stevedoring Inc., 961 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 2013) (holding that if usury can be gleaned from the face of an instrument,
intent will be implied, and usury will be found as a matter of law).
75 Id.
76 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 380-E (McKinney 2019).
77 Fareri v. Rain’s Int’l, Ltd., 589 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1992) (holding
that a transaction and supporting documents were void as a matter of law because as stipulated
by the parties, the agreement was usurious on its face, and therefore, usurious intent can be
inferred).
78 Id.
79 See generally Venables v. Sagona, 925 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011);
Abir v. Malky, Inc., 873 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009) (noting that all
usurious agreements will be void and unenforceable as a matter of law).
80 48 B.R. 538, 548. (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Blue Wolf Capital Fund II, L.P. v. Am. Stevedoring Inc., 961 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 2013). (holding that lenders found to be charging criminally usurious rates of
interest on a financial instrument are not entitled to equitable relief).
74
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of a financial instrument, indicating wrongdoing. 84 Regarding
financial recovery for creditors or lenders surrounding a financial
instrument, the courts apply “the equitable maxim that he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands.” 85
The consequences to the lender of a usurious
transaction can be harsh: the borrower is relieved of all
further payment—not only interest but also outstanding
principal, and any mortgages securing payment are
[cancelled]. In effect, the borrower can simply keep the
borrowed funds and walk away from the agreement.
Moreover, the borrower can recover any interest
payments made in excess of the legal rate (General
Obligations Law § 5-513). New York usury laws
historically have been severe in comparison to the
majority of states . . . reflecting the view of our
Legislature that the prescribed consequences are
necessary to deter the evils of usury. 86
Thus, a New York court will deny equitable relief to a lender
when a lender attempting to recover demonstrates egregious conduct,
such as fraud, unconscionability, or bad faith. 87
To evade New York laws, lenders use choice-of-law provisions
in a contract to avoid a state’s criminal usury statutes. 88 However, a
court can find a contract between parties invalid if the lender (or party)
used the contract as a cloak for usury. 89 If a contracting party uses a
choice-of-law provision to select a state that has no substantial
connection with the contract—to avoid an involving state’s criminal
usury statues—then a court can invalidate the contract. 90
84

Id.
Lia v. Saporito, 909 F. Supp. 2d 149, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that a party seeking
equitable relief must not have unclean hands).
86 Seidel v. 18 E. 17th St. Owners, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 7 (N.Y. 1992).
87 Balaber-Strauss v. Murphy, 331 B.R. 107, 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that
equitable relief may be denied where a party applying for such relief is guilty of conduct
involving fraud, unconscionability, or bad faith related to the matter at issue).
88 William B. Emmal, Evading Prohibitions on Usury Through Choice of Law (August
2009).
89 Cecily Fuhr, J.D., CJS INTEREST § 188 (2019). “The parties’ choice of law will be held
to constitute a sham or subterfuge when the contacts between the transaction and the chosen
state are not reasonably related or when the contracts themselves are contrived in order to
substantiate the parties’ choice of law.”
90 Id.
85
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NEW YORK’S SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP APPROACH AND
THE APPLICABILITY OF CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS

Commonly, a choice-of-law provision in a contract between
parties is effective and lawful if: “(1) the law of the selected
jurisdiction has a reasonable relationship to an agreement; and (2) the
chosen law does not violate a fundamental public policy of New
York.” 91 If a court deems a contract between two parties as usurious
under the general usury statutes of all states to which it has a substantial
relationship, then the forum will “apply the usury statute of that state
that imposes the lightest penalty.” 92 Under New York’s current
choice-of-law rule, known as the center of gravity approach, a court
will apply the law of the state that has the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute. 93
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that to ensure
that the choice-of-law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair, the
choice-of-law must be from a state that has significant contacts with
the parties and the occurrence or transaction in question. 94 Although
New York recognizes that “the choice of law principle that parties to a
contract have a right to choose the law to be applied in their contract,
this freedom of choice on the part of the parties is not absolute.” 95 To
determine the appropriateness of the parties’ choice-of-law, New York
follows the “substantial relationship” approach, as stated in
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law Section 187:(2):
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the
particular issue is one which the parties could not have
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either . . . the chosen state
has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the
parties’ choice, or . . . application of the law of the
Glen Banks, New York Practice Series: New York Contract Law § 8:5 (2019).
72 N.Y. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 57 (2019).
93 Id.
94 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-09 (1981) (holding that applying a choice
of law from a state with a mere slight and casual relationship to the parties and transaction
would be fundamentally unfair to a state with a greater relationship to the parties or the
transaction in question).
95 S. Leo Harmony, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
91
92
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chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than
the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties. 96
Under this approach, the law of the state chosen by the parties
to govern their contractual rights would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state that has a materially greater interest than the state
chosen between the parties in a contract. 97
A court considers many factors when determining if a state has
a substantial relationship to a transaction. In applying the substantial
relationship approach, New York follows the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Law’s significant relationship test. 98 In New York, the
factors considered in determining which state has a substantial
relationship to a transaction are: (1) the place of contracting, (2) the
place of negotiation of the contract, (3) the place of performance, (4)
the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (5) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of
the parties. 99 The courts are to evaluate the contacts according to their
relative importance concerning the issue in question. 100
New York courts generally enforce choice-of-law clauses. 101
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the substantial relationship
approach and held that “while the parties’ choice of law is to be given
heavy weight, the law of the state with the ‘most significant contacts’
is to be applied.” 102 In a contract between parties, New York law
should apply, even if there is a choice-of-law provision electing

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971).
AM. Equities Grp., Inc. v. Ahava Dairy Prods. Corp., No. 01 Civ.5207 (RWS), 2004 WL
870260, at *1, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2004)
98 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 182.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Glen Banks, New York Practices Series: New York Contract Law § 8:3 (2009). In the
absence of fraud or violation of a fundamental state policy, New York courts generally defer
to the choice-of-law made by the parties in their contract. Choice-of-law provisions are usually
honored because the parties are free to reach an agreement on whatever terms they prefer. Id.
102 Cargill, Inc. v. Charles Kowsky Resources, Inc., 949 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1991) (ruling
that New York law permits a court to disregard the parties’ choice-of-law provision in a
contract when the most significant contacts surrounding the dispute in question are in another
state).
96
97
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another state to govern if significant contacts were in New York. 103
Moreover, when a state does not have a reasonable relationship to a
contract between parties, and New York does have a reasonable
relationship, then New York law should apply to the contract in
question. 104 A court may establish a reasonable relationship with New
York if the parties negotiate and execute a financial instrument in New
York, the parties to a contract performed under the agreement in New
York, or the principal place of business for either party is in New
York. 105 In addition to the substantial relationship approach, New
York “has a strong public policy against interest rates which exceed
twenty-five percent.” 106
VII.

NEW YORK’S FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS
EFFECT ON CONTRACT PROVISIONS

States have different views on whether the protections against
usury represent fundamental policy. 107 Some states, like New York,
disregard choice-of-law provisions of another state’s laws that permit
higher interest rates or have no restriction on usury. 108 The policy
underlying New York’s usury laws is fundamental. 109 Therefore, to
permit loan contracts executed in New York State to be governed by
laws of other states, which have chosen to not outlaw usury, would
ultimately violate time-honored public policy. 110 Contracts that are
void due to public policy cannot become enforceable by estoppel. 111
In New York, for a policy to be fundamental, the policy must,
in any event, be a substantial one. 112 When it comes down to the

103 AM. Equities Grp., No. 01 Civ.5207 (RWS), 2004 WL 870260, at *1, *9 (holding that
because significant contacts were in New York, that New York law should apply, despite the
agreement that New Jersey law would govern).
104 Power Up Lending Grp., Ltd. v. Cardinal Energy Grp., Inc., 2:16-cv-1545 (DRH)(GRB),
2019 WL 1473090, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2019).
105 Id.
106 In re McCorhill Pub., Inc., 86 B.R. 783, 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
107 William B. Emmal, comment, Evading Prohibitions on Usury Through Choice of Law,
9 TRANSLAW 6 (2009).
108 Id.
109 American Law Reports, Conflict of laws as to usury, 125 A.L.R. 482 (1940).
110 Id.
111 Harvard Law Review, EFFECT OF ESTOPPEL UPON A CONTRACT VOID FOR
USURY, 19 HARV. L. REV. 454 (1906).
112 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971).
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fulfillment and satisfaction of a contract, the parties’ expectations and
considerations are not the only value of contract law.
The chosen law should not be applied without regard
for the interests of the state which would be the state of
the applicable law with respect to the particular issue
involved in the absence of an effective choice by the
parties. The forum will not refrain from applying the
chosen law merely because this would lead to a
different result than would be obtained under the local
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law.
Application of the chosen law will be refused only (1)
to protect a fundamental policy of the state which,
under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
otherwise applicable law, provided (2) that this state
has a materially greater interest than the state of the
chosen law in the determination of the particular
issue. 113
In New York, the courts will not enforce a choice-of-law clause
when a state has a fundamental public policy that is impacted by the
contract and has a greater material interest than the designated state
that is addressed in the choice-of-law provision of the contract.
New York has a fundamental public policy against interest
rates from creditors that exceed twenty-five percent. 114 Moreover,
New York enforces its heavy stance on its public policy against
excessive interest rates. 115 This essential public policy is further
bolstered by a ruling of the New York Supreme Court, where the court
held that the choice of Illinois law would not be given effect in part
because New York’s usury prohibition is a fundamental public policy,
and therefore, trumps the choice-of-law provision. 116 The court’s
ruling in Clever Ideas, Inc. conforms with the New York Court of
Appeals, which stated that it would not enforce a choice-of-law clause
in a contract “when New York’s nexus with the case is substantial
enough to threaten our public policy.” 117
113

Id.
AM. Equities Grp., No. 01 Civ.5207(RWS), 2004 WL 870260, at *1, *8.
115 American Exp. Travel Related Serv.’s Co., Inc. v. Assih, 893 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 2009).
116 Clever Ideas, Inc. v. 999 Rest. Corp., No. 0602302/06, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9248, at
*1, *2–4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Oct. 12, 2007).
117 Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1993).
114
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Additionally, New York’s decision to criminalize interest rates
exceeding twenty-five percent is further evidence that usury
prohibition is a fundamental public policy. 118 The courts in the Second
Circuit have recognized that New York’s criminal usury laws represent
an important and fundamental public policy that overrides a choice-oflaw provision. 119 Even if the substantial relationship test with another
state is satisfied, New York’s vital public policy reflected in its usury
laws overrides the substantial relationship test, and New York law
must apply. 120 Generally, New York courts will enforce a contract that
it does not deem criminally usurious under the laws of the contracting
state or country or where the parties were to perform. 121 Nonetheless,
if there is a violation of a fundamental public policy that New York
recognizes, then the loan will not be enforced and be deemed as
void. 122
Therefore, a court will enforce the substantive law of New
York when a borrower brings a claim of criminal usury surrounding a
financial instrument against a lender, even if there is a choice-of-law
provision that provides that another state’s law will govern the
transaction between the parties.
VIII. THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINALLY USURIOUS FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS IN NEW YORK
The New York usury laws apply to financial instruments, such
as loans and forbearances. 123 For a transaction to constitute a usurious
loan, there must be two parties contracting (a debtor/borrower and a
creditor/lender). 124 Additionally, it must appear that the real purpose
of the transaction was, on the one side, to lend or provide money or a
118 Electric & Magneto Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int’l Corp., 941 F.2d 660, 663 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the existence of a criminal provision is significant because the legislature would
not allow a criminal law to be bypassed by the mere existence of a choice-of-law provision
contained in a contract).
119 Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC., 237 F. Supp. 3d 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding
that New York’s interest in preventing criminal usury prevails over the choice-of-law
provisions set forth by parties in a contract).
120 Id.
121 72 N.Y. Jur. 2d § 57 (2019).
122 Id.
123 See generally Orvis v. Curtiss, 52 N.E. 690 (N.Y. 1899); Bristol Inv. Fund, Inc. v.
Carnegie Intern. Corp., 310 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the defense
of usury must be found upon a loan or forbearance of money).
124 Donatelli v. Siskind, 565 N.Y.S.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1991).
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form of money at a usurious interest reserved in some form by the
contract and, on the other side, to borrow upon the usurious terms
dictated by the creditor/lender. 125
There are two situations where criminal usury may be utilized:
prosecution and as an affirmative defense. While prosecution of this
crime is rare, courts have held that criminal usury is constitutional. In
People v. Fernandez, 126 the court reasoned that:
The statute is sufficiently definite so as to give a
reasonable man of ordinary intelligence fair,
unequivocal warning of what conduct is prohibited and
what is required of him. Persons who engage in the
business of making loans have sufficient intelligence in
mathematics to know when the “rates” exceed the
statutory limit and to therefore seek legal advice. No
fundamental “sense of justice” will be denied
defendants by subjecting them to prosecution under the
statute. 127
The Fernandez court’s recognition of the criminal usury statute
as constitutional is promising. However, avoidance of a criminally
usurious loan is not a question of constitutionality, but about lenders
being held accountable for their intentional actions and freeing
borrowers from the shackles of usurious loans. Courts should
explicitly void criminally usurious loans.
For prosecution purposes, a lender charging usurious interest
on a loan is elevated to criminal usury in the first degree, a class C
felony, when “either the actor had previously been convicted of the
crime of criminal usury or of the attempt to commit such crime, or the
actor’s conduct was part of a scheme or business of making or
collecting usurious loans.” 128 The New York Court of Appeals held
that a “scheme” is “a design or plan formed to accomplish some
purpose, and that ‘business’ means commercial activity engaged in for
a gain.” 129 The prosecution may offer evidence of usurious
transactions not specifically alleged in an indictment for criminal usury
in the first degree when an allegation states that the loan in question
125
126
127
128
129

Id.
402 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
Id.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.42 (McKinney 2019).
6 N.Y. Prac., Criminal Law § 19:15 (2019).
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was part of a scheme or business. 130 The Court of Appeals has held
that when the plaintiff charges the defendant with criminal usury, that
the defendant is “entitled to particulars as to the scheme or business
allegation in order to know what he [will] be called upon to defend
against.” 131
In transactions involving criminally usurious financial
instruments, “the effect of the exaction of an illegal rate of interest
differs under the various provisions of the consolidated laws which
deal with interest and usury.” 132 A criminally usurious financial
instrument is null and void, and a court grants no equitable relief to the
creditor executing the usurious financial instrument under the
sovereignty of New York. 133 A criminally usurious instrument is
treated as a pretense in New York and is ineffectual as a source of
obligation or right as a matter of law. 134
Further, in New York, not only is a criminally usurious
transaction void, but a court also has the statutory power to declare any
obligation or security taken by the lender in violation of the statute void
as well, as a matter of law. 135 In 2017, the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Second Department, recognized the
applicability of General Obligation Law Statute 5-511 as an
affirmative defense to a criminally usurious transaction, voiding the
underlying transaction. 136
Further, any other transaction arising or stemming from a
criminally usurious transaction is purged and treated as being null and
void. 137 The usurious nature of a contract or obligation is “to be
determined as of the time it is entered into, and an obligation void at
its inception for usury continues to be void forever, whatever its
subsequent history may be, unless it is purged of usury.” 138 In other
words, when a party executes a contract, and the total interest exceeds
the criminal usury threshold, the transaction is void at the moment that
130

Id.
Id.
132 72 N.Y. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 143 (2019).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Roopchand v. Mohammed, 62 N.Y.S.3d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2017) (ruling
that the defendants successfully met the burden of proving criminal usury and granted
defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action).
137 72 N.Y. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 148 (2019).
138 Id.
131

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 4

428

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

the contract was executed, and will continue to remain void and
unenforceable. Further, usury attaches to all consecutive obligations
or securities that derive from the original usurious transaction, and all
of those additional obligations are void. 139
IX.

THE AMBIGUOUS AND UNRESOLVED RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CRIMINALLY USURIOUS TRANSACTIONS AND
WAIVER

The issue of whether a party can waive its right to the
affirmative defense of usury is a gray area that riddles the courts. A
waiver is “[t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment – express or
implied – of a legal right or advantage.” 140 An express waiver is a
voluntary and intentional waiver of a legal right or advantage. 141 A
waiver may be implied by a party’s unequivocal conduct and actions
that are tantamount to reasonably inferring the intent to waive a legal
right or advantage. 142
The borrower may waive civil usurious transactions in a
transaction under CPLR 3211. 143
At any time before service of the responsive pleading is
required, a party may move on one or more of the
grounds set forth in subdivision (a), and no more than
one such motion shall be permitted. Any objection or
defense based upon a ground set forth in paragraphs
one, three, four, five and six of subdivision (a) is
waived unless raised either by such motion or in the
responsive pleading. A motion based upon a ground
specified in paragraph two, seven or ten of subdivision
(a) may be made at any subsequent time or in a later
pleading, if one is permitted; an objection that the
summons and complaint, summons with notice, or
notice of petition and petition was not properly served
is waived if, having raised such an objection in a
pleading, the objecting party does not move for
judgment on that ground within sixty days after serving
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Waiver, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Id.
Id.
CPTL Rule 3211(e) (McKinney’s 2006).
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the pleading, unless the court extends the time upon the
ground of undue hardship. 144
Thus, a party may explicitly or impliedly waive an affirmative
defense through not pleading the affirmative defense or objecting to a
claim on the basis of the affirmative defense.
However, criminally usurious transactions cannot be waived by
a party as an affirmative defense because New York has a fundamental
public policy against the enforcement of criminally usurious financial
instruments. 145 While there is minimal law in New York to support
this assertion, in Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 146 the New
York Court of Appeals addressed the waiver of a criminally usurious
transaction. 147
In Hammelburger, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, Second Department addressed a situation where the
defendant had first agreed in the contract to waive the usury defense
expressly. 148 Then, when the lender subsequently brought an action to
enforce the contract in question after the defendant defaulted, the
defendant failed to assert a criminal usury defense in its initial
pleadings, amounting to an implied waiver. 149 When the defendant
moved to amend its answer to include the usury defense, the trial court
denied the motion and granted summary judgment to the lender. 150
However, on appeal, the court vacated the trial court’s decision and
reversed in favor of the defendant. 151 The court held that “when a right
has been created for the betterment or protection of society as a whole,
an individual is incapable of waiving that right; it is not his to
waive.” 152 Aquila v. Rubio 153 reinforced this point. In Aquilla, the

144

Id.
American Law Reports, supra note 109.
146 431 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1981).
147 Id.
148 Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 437 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t
1980).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 360.
153 No. 33561-12, 2016 WL 17161968, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 2016).
145
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court held that a party could not waive its right to be safeguarded from
criminally usurious loans. 154
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals in Hammelburger ruled that
the transaction was lawful, even though the court deemed the
transaction to be criminally usurious. 155 Nonetheless, the New York
Court of Appeals did not directly address the waiver issue presented in
the case. 156 Unfortunately, this ruling (and perhaps the somewhat
unique facts of Hammelburger) has resulted in the courts viewing the
waiver issue as unresolved, with the resulting patchwork of
inconsistent rulings on the question of waiver. 157 Nonetheless, Judge
Cooke, who had ruled with the judges in Hammelburger, wrote a
concurring opinion that discussed waiver and its impact on criminally
usurious transactions. 158 Judge Cooke stated that “[a] lender who may
be criminally prosecuted for a particular loan should not be permitted
to avoid the civil consequences of this wrong through the simple
expedient of obtaining a waiver from the borrower.” 159 He continued
that as a matter of public policy, he would never hold that a criminal
usury transaction was waivable outside a judicial proceeding. 160 This
concurring opinion served as evidence that even though the judges in
Hammelburger ruled in favor of the lender, it was not because of the
waiver being applicable against a criminal usury defense.
While no case law directly addresses how a court should deal
with criminally usurious transactions when there has been a waiver,
the mere fact that New York has a fundamental public policy against
criminally usurious transactions dictates that waiver cannot be used to
estop a party from invoking criminal usury as an affirmative defense.

154 Id. at *1, *6 (holding that “[a] party cannot waive his right to be protected from
criminally usurious loans . . . [t]he right is not personal to the borrower, so as to be waivable
by him . . . [t]he right exists for the benefit of everyone.”).
155 431 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1981) (ruling that grant of summary judgment for the defendant
was improper).
156 Id.
157 See Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 437 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t
1980); American E Group LLC v. Livewire Ergogenics Inc., 1:18-cv-3969-GHW, 2020 WL
209903 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2020) (noting that while no final position was taken on the waiver
provision in the engagement letter, the court noted skepticism as to the waiver provision in the
engagement letter that stated “any conflicts shall be properly waived.”).
158 Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 431 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1981).
159 Id.
160 Id.
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“Litigants may waive rules of law or statutory provisions made in their
favor, where no considerations of public policy are involved.” 161
Thus, if a lender raises waiver, either express or implied, to
estop the borrower from asserting the affirmative defense of criminal
usury, a New York court should allow the borrower to raise criminal
usury as an affirmative defense because it concerns a fundamental
public policy.
X.

INCONSISTENCIES AND LACK OF CONFORMITY BETWEEN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF NEW
YORK’S USURY LAWS

Due to inconsistencies of statutory interpretation, the federal
courts have inappropriately applied New York’s laws on criminal
usury in dozens of cases. 162 These decisions resulted in a wide range
of differing opinions and judgments that are not consistent with the
longstanding history of usury in New York. 163 The only consistency
found among both federal and state courts in New York is that they
agree that the usury prohibition in New York reflects a longstanding
and fundamental public policy of the state of New York. 164 Through
these inconsistencies of statutory interpretation, parties who have
executed criminally usurious financial instruments seek to forum
shop 165 in order to evade the consequences of criminally usurious
transactions in New York. 166
In In re Ventures Mtge. Fund, L.P., 167 the Second Circuit
expressly flagged the question of whether a loan is void if it violates
New York’s criminal usury statute without violating New York’s civil
usury statute, as one that needed resolution by the New York state
courts. 168 The court speculated that, under a close reading of the
statutory scheme, the voidance mechanism of General Obligations
Stone v. Oneida Motor Car Co., 275 N.Y.S. 426 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1934).
See supra note 109.
163 Id.
164 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Sullivan, No. 97-CV-9282, 1998 WL 575137, at 1, 8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1998) (holding that criminal usury is a fundamental public policy).
165 “A litigant’s attempt to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where
he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.” Harvard Law Review,
FORUM SHOPPING RECONSIDERED, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (1990).
166 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., No. 97-CV-9282, 1998 WL 575137, at 8.
167 282 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2002).
168 Id.
161
162
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Law Statute 5-511(1) might not operate to void usurious loans that
only violated NY Penal Law Section 190.40 (i.e., the loans of $250,000
or more described in section 5-501(6)). 169 Notably, the court expressly
acknowledged that it made no decision on the issue and that the
question was framed “at some length in dictum because . . . this
opinion might otherwise be misread to settle or foreclose the issue in
the federal courts of this Circuit.” 170 Despite that caution, the federal
courts of the Second Circuit seem to have done precisely that. 171 The
courts seem to have even further restricted Section 5-511’s voidance
mechanism to be inoperable as against any loan found to be criminally
usurious, even loans for less than $250,000. 172
Many courts have applied General Obligations Law Statute 5511 to hold that all usurious contracts shall be void. 173 As mentioned
earlier, the New York Court of Appeals has confirmed that courts must
deem a transaction involving a financial instrument void if it is
usurious. 174 However, many federal courts fail to void criminally
usurious contracts relying on the reasoning that, unlike New York’s
civil usury statute, Penal Law Section 190.40 does not explicitly serve
to void instruments which violate it. 175 As a result of this oversight in
the drafting of Penal Law Section 190.40, some federal courts have
chosen to hold that General Obligations Law Statute 5-511 does not
void criminally usurious instruments simply because the criminal
usury statute does not expressly provide as such. 176 This significant
discrepancy between the federal and state courts have caused various
and different rulings on usurious transactions. These discrepancies
Id. at 190.
Id. at 187.
171 See generally Adar Bays, LLC, v. GeneSYS ID, Inc., 341 F.Supp.3d 339, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (finding that In re Venture posited that there was, “no specific statutory authority for
voiding a loan that violates the criminal usury statute.”); LG Capital Funding, LLC, v. Vapor
Group, Inc., 17-CV-1297-NGG-SJB, 2019 WL 3437973, at *1, *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2018)
(finding that the In re Venture’s non-voiding analysis would apply to a criminally usurious
loan of $115,000).
172 Id.
173 See Roopchand v. Mohammed, 62 N.Y.S.3d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2017);
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have led issuers of criminally usurious financial instruments to forum
shop for a favorable court that would not void a criminally usurious
financial instrument. This judicial loophole of forum shopping
ultimately leads lenders to evade the criminal usury laws enacted by
New York and undermines New York’s legislative intent.
XI.

CONCLUSION

All in all, when a transaction has been executed in New York
between two businesses, the transaction should be governed by New
York law if the transaction is substantially related to New York.
Additionally, when parties execute a transaction in New York, and a
court would violate New York’s fundamental public policy by
enforcing a choice-of-law provision, New York law should govern the
transaction. If a borrower is unable to invoke criminal usury as an
affirmative defense to an agreement due to a choice-of-law provision,
the objective of protecting the public is frustrated and hindered.
Further, a choice-of-law provision creates loopholes where a lender
can side-step the substantive statutes and regulations of a state, setting
a dangerous precedent for the future. As a matter of principle and
protecting the general public from loan-sharking, courts should
evaluate choice-of-law provisions on a case by case basis, and when a
choice-of-law provision in a contract conflicts with the public policy
of another state that has a reasonable relationship, that forum state
should govern the transaction in question.
Finally, reconciling the statutory language concerning criminal
and civil usury would be a big step to help clear confusion and
ambiguity in contracts already in place and protect and avoid
borrowers from paying a tremendous amount of interest that was once
hidden usury on a financial instrument. By reconciling the statutory
language of criminal and civil usury, the federal court’s rulings on
criminal usury cases will be consistent with New York State court’s
rulings, and ultimately, in unison with New York’s legislative intent.
Altogether, this will allow an approach to usury laws in New York that
aligns with the history and legislative intent of usury.
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